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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CHARLES DAVID WRIGHT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 940568-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f), whereby a defendant in a district 
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a 
first degree or capital felony. See also Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2) (a). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or 
in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-63a-l(b)(i)(A) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-301(1)(b) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102(3) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-306(3) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(2)(a) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(1) 
Utah Const, art. 1, § 12 
U.S. Const, amend. V 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court erroneously twice sentence Mr. Wright 
for the same offense in violation of the constitutional and statutory 
protections against double jeopardy? 
"Since questions of constitutional rights are questions of 
law, we give no deference to the trial court's conclusion . . . " 
State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 471 (Utah App. 1991); cf. Grayson 
Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 460 (Utah 1989) ("A trial 
court's legal conclusions are accorded no particular deference"); 
State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115, 120 (Utah App.) ("When examining a 
trial court's interpretation of a statutory provision we apply a 
correction of error standard"), cert. denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 
1991); State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989) (appellate 
courts "will set aside a sentence imposed by the trial court if the 
sentence represents an abuse of discretion, if the trial judge fails 
to consider all legally relevant factors, or if the sentence imposed 
exceeds the limits prescribed by law") (citations omitted). 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND A WRITTEN OPINION 
Although the Tenth Circuit and other jurisdictions have held 
that a trial court's oral sentence cannot be altered or superseded by 
a resentencing order which exceeds the punishment first imposed, Utah 
law does not specifically address the issue when a lawfully imposed 
sentence includes a term of incarceration which already has been 
partially served by the defendant. 
- 2 -
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATORE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a (re)sentence imposed following a 
conviction for attempted possession of incendiary device, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-102(3); 
76-10-306(3). (R 38-39; 83). On May 23, 1994, Mr. Charles David 
Wright pleaded guilty to the above charge pursuant to his plea 
bargain agreement. (R 23-31; 54-65). Following a continuance of 
the date set for sentencing, the proceeding was set for July 11. 
On July 11, 1994, the trial court sentenced Mr. Wright to 
zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison; a fine of $500.00 
together with an 85% surcharge; and an order of restitution if 
deemed to be appropriate. (R 77-78). The prison sentence was 
immediately stayed pending the successful completion of probation. 
(R 78) . Probationary terms and conditions included twelve months in 
jail (without credit for time served) although an earlier release 
from jail was allowed if Mr. Wright provided verification of his 
employment to Adult Probation and Parole. (R 78-79). Other terms 
and conditions included counseling or therapy (as recommended by 
AP&P); "any drug program if that is a problem"; "submit your person 
and your effects, your automobile, your residence, to search or 
seizure for the location of drugs"; and accompanying standard 
probationary terms prohibiting drug use or involvement. (R 78-79). 
On August 29, 1994, after Mr. Wright had already spent 
50 days in jail since his July 11, 1994 sentence, the trial court 
again imposed sentence. (R 94). No new charge or violation 
occurred; the August 29, 1994, resentencing proceeding stemmed from 
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the very same underlying charge and conviction as the July 11, 1994 
sentencing proceeding. (R 80-94). 
Claiming that the July 11 proceedings were merely 
"musings", (R 91), on August 29, 1994, the court resentenced 
Mr. Wright to zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison with 
credit for time served. (R 94). In contrast to its July 11, 1994, 
sentence, see (R 77-78), on August 29, 1994, the court determined 
that probation would not be appropriate. (R 38, 94). During the 
second sentencing proceeding, no fine was imposed although 
restitution was again ordered if found to be appropriate. (R 38, 
94) . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
While the facts of the offense are not necessarily germane 
to the issue on appeal, the sentencing proceedings themselves are 
important. The pertinent discussions are excerpted or recounted in 
detail below. 
Following the entry of plea proceeding, the court set 
June 20, 1994, for sentencing with the understanding that substitute 
defense counsel would appear for Mr. Wright. (R 65). However, on 
June 20, 1994, sentencing was continued. The court and substitute 
defense counsel expressed a preference to wait until Mr. Wright's 
original counsel had returned. (R 67-68). In addition, the court 
ordered another presentence report notwithstanding the existence of 
an abbreviated report on Mr. Wright which included a criminal 
history. (R 69) (the relevant discussions are footnoted below and 
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attached in Addendum B) .-1 The decision to await original defense 
counsel's return, however, was accompanied by the following court 
order: 
The court: All right. What I'm going to do is this. 
I'm going to order a presentence report. . . . 
The court: All right. What I'll do is I'll set this 
for the 11th of July, which is the first time she's 
[original defense counsel] available to be back. But 
in the meantime, I'm also going to order a presentence 
report. But that report will not be completed before 
the 2nd of August. 
If she [original defense counsel] can persuade me, we 
can proceed on the 11th without the report being 
completed, then I will do so. If not, then we'll keep 
the next date that I give you. 
So order a presentence report. I will set this for 
July 11th at two p.m., and then we'll also set another 
date, and that is August 1 at two p.m. for sentencing 
in the event that we do in fact have the presentence 
report. 
(R 67-70) (emphasis added). The proceedings concluded until July 11, 
1994, the date in which the court would first impose sentence. 
1. During the June 20, 1994, proceedings, substitute 
counsel for Mr. Wright entered into the following discussions with 
the court and the State: 
[Substitute defense counsel]: Because I talked to 
Mr. Wright and indicated to him I felt more comfortable, at 
least in light of my looking at the presentence report, to 
have [original defense counsel] address the court. He 
indicated that he wanted to try to get this over with 
today. But I think it would be important --
The court: The only presentence report, though, is his 
criminal history. I think you would be better 
- 5 
On July 11, 1994, Mr. Wright and his original counsel 
appeared before the court for sentencing. While the presentence 
report with a criminal history still was available, the report 
ordered on June 20, 1994 was not ready. (R 73-74) ("Apparently 
somehow the referral never made it to [AP&P] or [AP&P] didn't get 
down to interview Mr. Wright"). Nevertheless, the sentencing 
proceedings continued as Mr. Wright's original counsel persuaded the 
court that even without the ordered presentence report, c£. (R 70), 
Mr. Wright was entitled to probation: 
[Counsel for Mr. Wright]: I believe the State is 
still willing to recommend probation on this case [.] 
[the State originally recommended probation when it 
appeared that he would be extradited to Iowa.] . . . 
1. -[footnote continued]-
served to wait until [original defense counsel] gets here, 
[Mr. Wright]: Okay. 
[The State]: Do we know why the only thing we have is that 
criminal history? 
The court: I don't know. Did you look to see if we have 
an old presentence report prepared in another court? 
I mean, if for no other reason, we need [original 
defense counsel] to refresh our recollection on this. 
[The State]: I assumed there was a presentence report, but 
I don't see it. 
[Substitute defense counsel]: Let me tell you why there is 
no presentence. There was a old -- out of state of Iowa --
extradition hold. And part of the plea agreement in this 
This incident took place at the co-defendants 
house. Apparently Mr. Wright and the co-defendant had 
some materials for pipe bombs. They went out to their 
back yard where there was nobody around, Mr. Wright 
and the co-defendant let off one of the pipe bombs. 
The neighbor called because of the noise and smoke 
that was coming back from the back yard. The police 
came over and investigated, and found some gun powder 
and some pipes at the co-defendant's residence. 
Mr. Wright was . . . there. Mr. Wright had indicated 
to me that he has employment that he's able to go to 
if he is released. He obviously has done 120 [days in 
jail through] today, he was booked on March 7, 1994. 
And I would ask the court to put him on probation, 
refer him to [AP&P]. He does have -- has been 
diagnosed as being bipolar, and I think Adult 
Probation and Parole can have him evaluated and have 
him undergo any counseling if needed. 
The court: All right. [The State], do you have 
anything on this? 
[The State]: Your honor, I submit it. I think if we 
can verify employment, I don't think I would be 
hesitant in going along with that. 
(R 75-77). Following statements by defense counsel and the 
prosecution, the trial court asked Mr. Wright if he had anything to 
1. -[footnote continued]-
case was that if Mr. Wright agreed to return to the state 
of Iowa, that the recommendation would be probation. 
What [original defense counsel did] is contact . . . the 
head of the warrants division at the sheriffs office, and 
she discovered that Iowa doesn't have an NCIC Warrant, only 
a legal warrant in Iowa. 
So they are not going to extradite him. So that's where we 
are at, I think. 
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say before it imposed sentence. (R 77). After Mr. Wright exercised 
his right of allocution, the court lawfully imposed sentence: 
The court: In this matter, Mr. Wright, is there 
anything you wish to say before sentence is imposed? 
[Mr. Wright]: The only thing I could say is, I just 
really had no idea what we were doing was this 
serious. We were just making little fire works. Now 
that I know, of course, this will not happen again. 
The court: Anything else? 
[Counsel for Mr. Wright]: No your Honor. 
The court: In this matter, Mr. Wright, in which you 
1. -[footnote continued]-
The court: I wonder if we ought to have a presentence 
report done at this time, then. 
[Substitute defense counsel]: That may be appropriate. 
The court: All right. What I'm going to do is this. I'm 
going to order a presentence report. . . . 
The court: All right. What I'll do is I'll set this for 
the 11th of July, which is the first time she's [original 
defense counsel] available to be back. But in the 
meantime, I'm also going to order a presentence report. 
But that report will not be completed before the 2nd of 
August. 
If she can persuade me we can proceed on the 11th without 
the report being completed, then I will do so. If not, 
then we'll keep the next date that I give you. 
So order a presentence report. I will set this for July 
11th at two p.m., and then we'll also set another date, and 
that is August 1 at two p.m. for sentencing in the event 
that we do in fact have the presentence report. 
(R 67-70) (emphasis added). 
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plead[ed] guilty to [a] third degree felony, the court 
will impose a sentence of zero . . . to five years in 
the state penitentiary, a fine of five hundred 
dollars, [eighty-five] percent surcharge, and an order 
of restitution, if that's appropriate. I don't know 
that it's appropriate. Your period in the state 
penitentiary will be stayed pending successful 
completion of probation, which will have the following 
terms and conditions: You're to serve 12 months [in] 
Salt Lake County Jail, without credit for time served. 
Now, in setting that, because I don't know exactly 
what to do now, I want . . . Adult Probation and 
Parole for them to verify by some means other than 
just merely calling a phone number, to verify your 
employment. 
If that's verifiable, then I would very likely 
allow you out right then to begin your work. But 
since I'm unsure right now, I'm going to make it 12 
months. 
You're to complete any counselling or therapy 
recommended by . . . Adult Probation and Parole. 
Which may include a drug evaluation, and compliance 
with any drug program if that is a problem. You're to 
submit your person and your effects, your automobile, 
your residence, to search or seizure for the location 
of drugs. 
You're to submit your person for the testing or 
presence of the unlawful drugs in your blood stream. 
And you're not to use any unlawful drawings or possess 
any [paraphernalia]. You're not to associate with 
persons who knowingly use drugs in an unlawful 
fashion. You're not to frequent places where drugs 
are known to be unlawfully used or distributed. 
And I'm going to -- how is it easier -- I guess it 
will take another appearance to allow him to get out 
earlier than the 12 months, but what I want is for 
. . . Adult Probation and Parole, so they know exactly 
what should happen when Mr. Wright is released, in 
terms of counselling, therapy or what have you, and to 
have verified that he does in fact have the 
employment. Because the employment is one of the key 
factors that I'm relying upon for a release earlier 
than the 120 days. 
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So Mr. Wilson [of AP&P] will be down to see you in 
jail some time this week to talk to you about this 
matter. It will be 36 months probation. 
(R 77-79) (emphasis added). 
On August 29, 1994, sentencing proceedings were again held 
despite the objections of Mr. Wright's counsel. (R 83-84). 
According to the court, the July 11, 1994, sentence only constituted 
"musings". (R 91). While the court acknowledged the July 11, 1994, 
proceeding, it attempted to justify another sentencing proceeding on 
the grounds that: 
When this matter was originally set for sentencing 
[on July 11], there was not someone present from the 
presentence arm of Adult Probation and Parole. And 
the county attorney [then] attending . . . could not 
have been expected to know . . . that we'd ordered a 
presentence report. 
It's not your obligation [defense counsel's] to 
bring that to my attention when it appears as if I'm 
about to do something that's favorable to you client. 
No one brought that to my attention. I am not 
suggesting in any way it was your obligation, because 
I don't think it was. 
As a consequence, I didn't realize that on some 
prior occasion I had indicated I did need a 
presentence report. There was no one here to be heard 
from on the other side, and that's why I proceeded as 
I did, because all I had in front of me was a 
memorandum dated June 6, 1994, reciting only the 
criminal history of the defendant. 
When I was apprised that I did not have all the 
information that I had originally sought, that was 
when I made sure that I did not take the final step in 
imposing a sentence, and that is, signing the 
documents. That's when this matter was put back on 
the schedule, and that's why we're here today. 
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(R 85-86) . The court also referred repeatedly but mistakenly to 
Orange Street, a treatment center, as a probationary term or 
condition. (R 82, 83, 94). The court did not argue that the first 
sentence imposed was illegal. 
Instead the focus turned to psychological evaluations which 
had diagnosed Mr. Wright as having a mental illness. See, e.g., 
(R 88) ("In 1980 they said he was . . . antisocial. Another said he 
was passive aggressive in 1981"); but cf. (R 76) (the court already 
had been earlier informed of Mr. Wright's bipolar diagnosis during 
the first sentencing proceeding on July 11, 1994). Treatment 
programs also were discussed, but such programs either did not 
consider Mr. Wright to be an appropriate candidate or would not 
place him without a court referral. (R 88-89; 91-92). 
After addressing such matters and without even suggesting 
the occurrence of a new or different violation since the July 11, 
1994, sentencing proceeding, the court again sentenced Mr. Wright on 
August 29, 1994, for the same underlying conviction: 
The court: All right. Mr. Wright, is there anything 
you wish to say before sentence is imposed? 
[Mr. Wright]: No 
The court: In this matter the court will impose 
sentence of zero to five years in the state 
penitentiary. It will impose no fine. There will be 
an order of restitution, if restitution is 
appropriate. Given the defendant's inability to 
complete Orange Street before, and there is an 
elaborate indication in the presentence reports as to 
why, that was one half-way house that I had in mind, 
and I either expressed that on the record or I was at 
least thinking that. 
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Now, the presentence report indicated to me that 
that would probably be an inappropriate placement, and 
as a consequence, there's no other placement I have. 
For this reason, this is not a an appropriate case for 
probation. 
[Counsel for Mr. Wright]: Your Honor, Mr. Wright has 
served --
The court: He will get credit for time served. 
[Counsel for Mr. Wright]: 163 days from March 6. 
(R 94); see also (R 38). 
Mr. Wright appeals the court's second sentence, an order in 
excess of the previously imposed July 11, 1994, sentence. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A court's oral sentencing order is valid and enforceable. 
Particularly where, as here, a defendant has begun to serve a period 
of incarceration pursuant to the court's oral sentence, the validity 
of the oral sentence is not suspended indefinitely by the court's 
delayed signing of the order. The court may only correct an illegal 
sentence. Since the court's initial oral sentence was entirely 
proper, it lost jurisdiction to "correct" the matter. The court's 
attempt to do so violated the statutory and constitutional 
protections against double jeopardy. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE COURT'S ORAL SENTENCING ORDER, WHICH REQUIRED 
MR. WRIGHT TO IMMEDIATELY BEGIN HIS PERIOD OF 
PROBATION, WAS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE AND A SUBSEQUENT 
WRITTEN SENTENCE WHICH ATTEMPTED TO INCREASE ITS PRIOR 
ORDER WAS A NULLITY AND AN IMPROPER MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT 
"The Double Jeopardy Clause affords three separate 
constitutional protections. Under the clause, either an acquittal 
or a conviction on a particular charge bars another prosecution on 
the same charge. The clause also bars multiple punishments for the 
same offense." State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah 1989) 
(emphasis added); see U.S. Const, amend. V ("nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb"); Utah Const, art. I § 12 ("nor shall any person be twice put 
in jeopardy for the same offense"); accord Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-1-6 (2) (a) . 
In the case at bar, Mr. Wright pleaded guilty to "attempted 
possession of an incendiary device", (R 23-30), a third degree 
felony. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-102(3); 76-10-306(3). By statute, a 
punishment for a third degree felony may include "a term not to 
exceed five years", Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3); a $5000.00 fine, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-301(1) (b); a surcharge, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-63a-l(b) (i) (A) ; and/or a period of probation. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-3-201(2) (c) ; 77-18-1(2) (a). In accordance with the above 
authorities, on July 11, 1994, the trial court imposed the following 
lawful sentence: 
The court: In this matter, Mr. Wright, in which you 
plead[ed] guilty to [a] third degree felony, the court 
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will impose a sentence of zero . . . to five years in 
the state penitentiary, a fine of five hundred 
dollars, [eighty-five] percent surcharge, and an order 
of restitution, if that's appropriate. I don't know 
that it's appropriate. Your period in the state 
penitentiary will be stayed pending successful 
completion of probation, which will have the following 
terms and conditions: You're to serve 12 months [in] 
Salt Lake County Jail, without credit for time served. 
. . . Because the employment is one of the key 
factors that I'm relying upon for a release earlier 
than the 120 days. 
So Mr. Wilson [of AP&P] will be down to see you in 
jail some time this week to talk to you about this 
matter. It will be 36 months probation. 
(R 77-78) (July 11, 1994, sentencing proceeding) (emphasis added). 
In setting the 12 month jail term, the court did not know whether 
Charles Wright's employment was verifiable. Since the court was 
uncertain about Mr. Wright's job status, it let stand the twelve 
month jail term and conditioned his early release from jail upon 
proof of employment. (R 78-79). Other probationary terms and 
conditions allowed AP&P to monitor drug use or unlawful activity. 
(R 78-79). 
In short, there was nothing improper about the court's 
sentence which ordered Mr. Wright to serve a (stayed) prison term, a 
fine, a surcharge, and probation. (R 77-79). Indeed, immediately 
following the court's July 11, 1994, sentencing order, Mr. Wright 
began serving his probationary term in jail. (R 79). 
However, on August 29, 1994, a full fifty (50) days after 
the July, 11, 1994, sentence, Mr. Wright was brought back before the 
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court for resentencing despite the objections of defense counsel. 
(R 83-84) . 
According to the court, the July 11, 1994, sentence only 
constituted "musings". (R 91). While the court acknowledged the 
July 11, 1994, proceeding, it attempted to justify another 
sentencing proceeding on the grounds that: 
When this matter was originally set for sentencing 
[on July 11], there was not someone present from the 
presentence arm of Adult Probation and Parole. . . . 
As a consequence, I didn't realize that on some 
prior occasion I had indicated I did need a 
presentence report. There was no one here to be heard 
from on the other side, and that's why I proceeded as 
I did, because all I had in front of me was a 
memorandum dated June 6, 1994, reciting only the 
criminal history of the defendant. 
When I was apprised that I did not have all the 
information that I had originally sought, that was 
when I made sure that I did not take the final step in 
imposing a sentence, and that is, signing the 
documents. That's when this matter was put back on 
the schedule, and that's why we're here today. 
(R 85-86) . 
Contrary to its contentions, the court never conditioned 
its sentence on the presence of AP&P. In fact, the court 
specifically allowed sentencing to proceed without the report. 
Previously, on June 20, 1994, the court stated: 
The court: All right. What I'll do is I'll set this 
for the 11th of July, which is the first time she's 
[original defense counsel] available to be back. But 
in the meantime, I'm also going to order a presentence 
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report. But that report will not be completed before 
the 2nd of August. 
If she [original defense counsel] can persuade me, we 
can proceed on the 11th without the report being 
completed, then I will do so. If not, then we711 keep 
the next date that I give you. 
So order a presentence report. I will set this for 
July 11th at two p.m., and then we'll also set another 
date, and that is August 1 at two p.m. for sentencing 
in the event that we do in fact have the presentence 
report. 
(R 70) (June 20, 1994, proceeding) (emphasis added); accord (R 33). 
On July 11, 1994, Mr. Wright and his original counsel 
appeared before the court for sentencing. While the presentence 
report with a criminal history still was available, the report 
ordered on June 20, 1994 was not ready. (R 73-74) ("Apparently 
somehow the referral never made it to [AP&P] or [AP&P] didn't get 
down to interview Mr. Wright"). 
Nevertheless, the sentencing proceedings continued as 
Mr. Wright's original counsel persuaded the court that even without 
the ordered presentence report, cf. (R 70), Mr. Wright was entitled 
to probation. (R 75-76). The State concurred in defense counsel's 
recommendation of probation, (R 77), and Mr. Wright was allowed to 
address the court before sentencing. (R 77). Accord Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1(7) ("At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any 
testimony, evidence, or information the defendant or the prosecuting 
attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate sentence"); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). 
The presentence report was not a prerequisite to 
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sentencing, (R 70), nor is it required by statute. See Utah Code 
Ann, § 77-18-1(5) (a). The court's claimed need for the report or 
for someone from AP&P is unsupported by the record and by law. Id.; 
see also State v. Garfield, 552 P.2d 129 (Utah 1976) (contrary to 
the court's belief that "the county attorney attending [the original 
July 11, sentencing] . . . could not have been expected to know 
. . . that we'd ordered a presentence report [,]" [R 85], "staff 
lawyers in a prosecutor's office have the burden of 'letting the 
left hand know what what the right hand is doing' or has done"). 
The court's attempt to use the written sentencing order of 
August 29, 1994, to supersede the unwritten sentencing order of 
July 11, 1994, was also erroneous. The orally pronounced sentence 
of July 11, 1994, should not have been altered. 
The Tenth Circuit opinion of United States v. Villano, 816 
F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1987), lends guidance. The judge there orally 
pronounced a sentence which amounted to eight years in prison. 
However, the judgment and commitment order, signed the same day as 
the sentencing proceeding, listed a prison term of ten years. 816 
F.2d at 1450. Villano appealed his sentence and the circuit court 
reversed. 
"It is a firmly established and settled principle of 
federal criminal law that an orally pronounced sentence controls 
over a judgment and commitment order when the two conflict. This 
rule is recognized in virtually every circuit and has been the law 
in this circuit since the 1930's." Villano, 816 F.2d at 1450-51 
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(footnotes omitted).2 The Tenth Circuit court of appeals 
acknowledged that a judgment must be signed, id. at 1451 n.4 (citing 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(1), but it still held that a signature was 
not determinative of a sentence: 
The sentence orally pronounced from the bench is 
the sentence. One of the purposes of the written 
judgment and commitment order is to provide evidence 
of the sentence. The promulgation of Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 32(b)(1) has not changed the rule that the judgment 
in a criminal case is the sentence orally pronounced 
from the bench. Although Rule 32(b) has "enhanced the 
2. The Tenth Circuit cited widespread authority in support 
of its holding "that the legally effective sentence is the oral 
sentence and the judgment and commitment order is mere evidence of 
the sentence." Villano, 816 F.2d at 1452. The cited authority is 
reprinted verbatim: 
United States v. Lewis, 626 F.2d 940, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
("The oral sentence constitutes the judgment of the court 
and is the authority for the execution of the court's 
sentence. The written commitment is mere evidence of such 
authority."); Borum v. United States, 409 F.2d 433, 440 
(D.C. Cir. 1967, cert, denied, 395 U.S. 916, 89 S.Ct 1765, 
23 L.Ed.2d 23 0 (1969) ("It was the pronouncement of sentence 
. . . that constituted the judgment of the court."); Gilliam 
v. United States, 269 F.2d 770, 772-73 (D.C. Cir. 1959) 
("the order of judgment and commitment is merely evidence 
of this sentence [the oral sentence]. . . . " ) ; Kennedy v. 
Reid, 249 F.2d 492, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ("The 
pronouncement of sentence constitutes the judgment of the 
court."); Rowley v. Welch, 114 F.2d 499, 501 (D.C. Cir. 
1940); United States v. Marquez, 506 F.2d 620, 622 (2d Cir. 
1974) ("the written judgment and commitment being nothing 
more than mere evidence of the sentence imposed orally by 
the judge."); Sasser v. United States, 352 F.2d 796, 797 
(6th Cir. 1965), cert, denied, 385 U.S. 883, 87 S.Ct. 174, 
17 L.Ed.2d 111 (1966) ("the pronouncement of sentence 
represents the judgment of the court and that the order of 
judgment is merely evidence of the sentence. . . . " ) ; 
- [footnote continued on next page]-
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prestige of the written judgment," it has not 
abrogated the rule that the judgment in a federal 
criminal case is the sentence pronounced from the 
bench. 
. . . Despite the existence of Rule 32(b), [which 
became effective in 1946], the law continues to be 
that the legally effective sentence is the oral 
sentence and the judgment and commitment order is mere 
evidence of the sentence. Altering the rule would 
change the relative status of the oral sentence and 
the judgment and commitment order by making the two 
equal. As previously noted, however, the true 
function of the written document is to help clarify an 
ambiguous oral sentence by providing evidence of what 
was stated. Because there is no ambiguity in this 
case, the effect of the change would be to permit the 
evidence of the sentence to replace the sentence when 
there is a conflict. This is contrary to the purpose 
of the judgment and commitment order and changes the 
legal status of the oral sentence. 
Changing the rule as suggested also would endanger 
the right to be present at sentencing. . . . A 
defendant is present only when being sentenced from 
the bench. Thus, a defendant is sentenced in absentia 
when the judgment and commitment order is allowed to 
control when there is a conflict. 
Villano, 816 F.2d at 1451-52 (citations omitted). 
Rule 32(b)(1) of the federal rules of criminal procedure 
provides in pertinent part: "A judgment of conviction shall set 
2. -[footnote continued]-
Wilson v. Bell, 137 F.2d 716, 720 (6th Cir. 1943) ("the 
judgment in a criminal case is the pronouncement by the 
judge from the bench, not the entry of the judgment by the 
clerk. The actual authority for execution of the judgment 
is the sentence, and the commitment functions to make the 
judgment of the court effective."); United States v. Weir, 
724 F.2d 94, 95 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) ("the oral 
sentence and not the written order constitutes the actual 
- [footnote continued on next page]-
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forth the plea, the verdict or findings, and the adjudication and 
sentence. . . . The judgment shall be signed by the judge and 
entered by the clerk." Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(1). Utah's 
counterpart, Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c), -(d), completely omits a 
signature requirement and suggests that the imposition of sentence 
precedes the ministerial task of filling out the commitment form: 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty . . . , the 
court shall impose sentence and shall enter a judgment 
of conviction which shall include the plea or the 
verdict, if any, and the sentence. . . . 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the 
court shall issue its commitment setting forth the 
sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the 
jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the 
commitment to the jail or prison and shall make his 
return on the commitment and file it with the court. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c), -(d). 
2. - [footnote continued]-
judgment of the court.. . . . " ) ; Johnson v. Mabry, 602 F.2d 
167, 170 (8th Cir. 1979) ("the oral sentence pronounced by 
the sentencing judge constitutes the judgment, and anything 
inconsistent with the judgment which is included in a 
commitment order is a nullity."); Buie v. King, 137 F.2d 
497, 499 (8th Cir. 1943); United States v. Munoz Dela Rosa, 
495 F.2d 253, 256 (9th Cir. 1974) ("The only sentence that 
is legally cognizable is the actual oral pronouncement in 
the presence of the defendant."); Spriggs v. United States, 
225 F.2d 865, 868 (9th Cir. 1955), cert, denied, 350 U.S. 
954, 76 S.Ct. 342, 100 L.Ed. 830 (1956) ("The journal entry 
or signed document is not the order of the court. The 
order of the court is the pronouncement made by the judge 
in open court."); Walden v. Hudspeth, 115 F.2d 558, 559 
(10th Cir. 1940) (lf[t]he judgment is the pronouncement of 
the court from the bench. The clerk's entry is not the 
judgment by merely the formal evidence thereof."). 
United States v. Villano, 816 F.2d 1448, 1452 n.5 (10th Cir. 1987). 
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State v. Cousins, 302 N.W.2d 731 (Neb. 1981), offers 
additional support in regards to the prevailing force of an oral 
sentencing order. There, the trial court inadvertently imposed 
"concurrent" sentences when it had meant to say "consecutive" 
sentences. The appellate court, however, rejected the claim of 
inadvertence: 
to begin questioning whether a valid sentence has been 
pronounced inadvertently would involve this court in a 
morass. We would be called upon to read the mind of 
the sentencing judge in any circumstance in which a 
valid sentence had been pronounced and later amended 
due to the judge's proclaimed inadvertence. 
302 N.W.2d at 733; see also id. at 732 ("The rule is that a sentence 
validly imposed takes effect from the time it is pronounced and that 
a subsequent sentence fixing a different term is a nullity") 
(citation omitted). The Nebraska supreme court unanimously allowed 
the orally pronounced "concurrent" sentence to remain in place even 
though only six minutes had elapsed before the "consecutive" 
sentence had been put in place. Ld. at 732-33; cf:. State v. Penney, 
776 P.2d 91, 93 (Utah App. 1989) ("An unambiguous order made in a 
criminal proceeding cannot be varied by remarks made in a later 
hearing to coincide with what the judge may have intended"); 
Villano, 816 P.2d at 1452 (since an oral sentence and a judgment and 
commitment order are not equal, an unambiguous oral sentence cannot 
be circumvented by such a writing). 
As in Villano and Cousins, in Utah the written judgment and 
commitment order is nothing more than clerical evidence of the 
initially imposed oral sentence. For example, in State v. Lorrah, 
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761 P.2d 1388 (Utah 1988) (per curiam), the trial court, in 
accordance with the statutory proscribed punishments for rape of a 
child convictions, "orally pronounced sentence . . . that 'the 
defendant be incarcerated . . . with the minimum recommendation of 
ten years.'" Id. at 1389. However, a later recorded "judgment, 
sentence (commitment)" form mistakenly reflected a lesser sentence. 
Defendant Lorrah attempted to use the recorded discrepancy in 
support of his claim that the written sentencing form should control 
over the oral sentence. Id. 
The appellate court disagreed. Noting simply that the 
"pronounced sentence . . . was improperly reduced to writing [,]" id. 
at 1390, the opinion deferred to "the language and intent of the 
court's pronouncement of oral sentence ..." ^d. at 1389; see also 
id. (on alternative grounds, although the oral sentence was proper, 
the written sentence was illegal [it did not adhere to the necessary 
statutory requirements] and thus could be corrected at any time). 
One important fact further reflects why the court's oral 
sentencing order exists in law and in application. Immediately 
following the July 11, 1994, sentencing proceeding, Charles David 
Wright actually began serving his probationary term of twelve months 
in jail. (R 79). Mr. Wright completed fifty days of his probation 
before the court called him back for resentencing. (R 79, 94). 
A similar situation was held to be improper in Bullock v. 
State, 705 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. App. 5 Dist. 1986). In Bullock, 
on April 2, 1985, the judge orally sentenced appellant 
and ordered that his sentence run concurrently with 
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any other sentences appellant was serving. However, 
on April 16, 1985, after conducting a new sentencing 
hearing and noting that he had orally entered into the 
record that appellant's sentence should run 
concurrently, the judge determined that it was his 
intention that the sentence should run consecutively. 
The judge then signed a judgment ordering that the 
sentence run consecutively. 
705 S.W.2d at 815. 
On appeal, the court found the subsequent written order to 
be null and void and of no legal effect. "[I]n a criminal case, the 
judgment cannot be modified to increase punishment, even during the 
same term of the court, if the defendant has commenced service of 
his imprisonment or paid his fine." Id. at 815-16 (construing 
United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931)); see Benz, 282 U.S. at 
307 ("to increase the penalty is to subject the defendant to double 
punishment for the same offense in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment . . . " ) . 
The Bullock opinion also rejected the notion that the 
written judgment of April 16, 1985, constituted a nunc pro tunc 
judgment which corrected the oral sentencing order of April 2, 
1985. Bullock, 705 S.W.2d at 816: 
The purpose of a nunc pro tunc judgment is to 
correct clerical errors and to make the record "speak 
the truth." The correction can only be as to what was 
actually done at the time and not what should have 
been done. Here, the judge orally pronounced that the 
sentence was to run concurrently. We hold that the 
trial court cannot later change the judgment to 
reflect what it "had intended to do," but did not do, 
where the defendant has already commenced service 
under the prior sentencing order. 
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705 S.W.2d at 816 (emphasis added by the court and citations 
omitted). 
In Bullock, resentencing proceedings held fourteen days 
after the original order were deemed unacceptable because the 
defendant had begun his period of confinement. Id. at 815-16. In 
the case at bar, Charles Wright had been confined for a full 50 days 
of his initially imposed probationary sentence before he was brought 
back before the court for resentencing. (R 79, 94). Mr. Wright's 
situation is equally unacceptable. 
Under the lower court's claimed signature requirement, its 
July 11, 1994, order did not constitute a "sentence", but it still 
inexplicably carried enough force and effect to subject Mr. Wright 
to a term of imprisonment. (R 79, 86). Moreover, under the court's 
flawed rationale, Mr. Wright fulfilled part of his probationary term 
without a sentence even being in place. (R 86, 94). Such reasoning 
must fail. 
The statutory and constitutional double jeopardy 
protections aptly guard against such intolerable results. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (2) (a); U.S. Const, amend. V; Utah Const, art. I 
§ 12. The court's orally pronounced sentence, which included a 
probationary term of twelve months in jail, may not be discounted as 
a punishment if 50 days of that jail term were actually served. 
Time in jail is a punishment, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2)(d), and a 
subsequent written punishment cannot change that fact. See Combs v. 
Turner, 25 Utah 2d 397, 483 P.2d 437, 440 (1971) ("the great weight 
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of authority is to the effect that no change of sentence, even by 
way of mitigation, is permissible after a prisoner has been 
committed"); cf. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) (the 30 day limitation for 
sentencing was clearly violated by the court's August 29, 1994, 
sentence --an order which finally occurred ninety-eight [98] days 
after Mr. Wright's plea had been entered).3 
Because Mr. Wright actually served a period of 
incarceration, the later addition of a signature to a typewritten 
preprinted sentencing form truly becomes just a ministerial act for 
purposes of sentencing. Although a signed order is a final judgment 
for purposes of appeal, see, e.g., Gallardo v. Bolinder, 800 P.2d 
816, 817 (Utah 1990) (per curiam), appellate procedural filing 
requirements do not nullify the validity of the initially imposed 
oral sentence. The Tenth Circuit in Villano was aware of, but 
unpersuaded by, the signature requirement for judgments, see 816 
F.2d at 1451 n.4 (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b) (1)), and courts in 
general have not ignored the different stance afforded sentenced 
persons who actually served part of their orally imposed sentence as 
opposed to persons not yet affected. See Combs v. Turner, 25 Utah 
3. When the court finally signed its August 29, 1994, 
sentencing order, Mr. Wright had been incarcerated for 163 days. 
(R 38, 94-95). His plea was entered on May 23, 1994 and 98 days had 
passed before the court signed its August 29, 1994, sentencing 
order. (R 38, 63, 94). Although a June 20, 1994 sentencing date 
was rescheduled, (R 70), the 30 day limitation for sentencing still 
was violated due to the 49 day expiration of time between July 11, 
1994, and August 29, 1994. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). Mr. Wright only 
agreed to continue sentencing until July 11, 1994. 
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2d 397, 483 P.2d 437, 440 (1971) (since "the original sentences had 
gone into effect, and that one day of imprisonment . . . under the 
sentences had passed at the time the order was made vacating them[,] 
[t]he circuit judge had no power at that time to vacate the 
sentences because the authority over "the prisoners had passed out of 
his hands by his own order") (citation omitted); Bullock v. State, 
705 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. App. 5 Dist. 1986). 
Parry v. State, 837 P.2d 998 (Utah App. 1992), is not 
inconsistent with the case at bar. In Parry, "the trial court 
apparently [orally] described the aggravated burglary [conviction] 
as 'aggravated burglary, a third degree felony.7" Id. at 998 
(emphasis added by the court). The subsequent written judgment and 
sentence form, however, read, "Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree 
Felony." I_d. (emphasis added by the court). 
Explaining that the initial oral sentence "created an 
illegal or impossible conviction," the Parry opinion held that the 
subsequent written judgment appropriately corrected the initial 
defective sentence. See id. at 999 ("The trial court's oral 
judgment of 'aggravated burglary, a third degree felony,' created an 
illegal or impossible conviction, because under Utah's statutory 
definition of aggravated burglary, it is a first degree felony"). 
The trial court's denial of defendant Parry's petition for writ of 
habeas corpus was affirmed. Id. 
By comparison, the court's July 11, 1994, sentencing order 
was not illegal. (R 77-79). It lawfully set forth the appropriate 
prison term, a fine, a surcharge, and a period of probation. 
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(R 78-79) . See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-63a-l(b) (i) (A) ; 76-3-201 (2) (c); 
76-3-203(3); 76-3-301 (1) (b); and 77-18-1 (2) (a) . 
Viewed differently, the trial court in Parry retained 
jurisdiction to correct its initial unlawful oral sentence and it 
did so through its written judgment. Parry, 837 P.2d at 999. Oral 
or written means may have both been used to fix the initial 
illegality. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) ("The court may correct an 
illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any 
time") . 
In Mr. Wright's case, however, since the court's initial 
sentence was lawful, the court was powerless to change an order 
which did not require correction. See State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 
676, 679 (Utah 1991) ("Once a court imposes a valid sentence, it 
loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case"); People v. Day, 
339 N.W.2d 204 (Mich. App. 1983) (original oral orders were valid 
final sentences which left the court "without jurisdiction to vacate 
or amend those sentences" even though the second sentencing 
proceedings resulted from the defendant's verbal outbursts and his 
exposing of himself); Richards v. Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314, 471 P.2d 
143, 146 (1970) ("The law does not permit any judicial tribunal to 
exercise any revisory power over its own adjudications after they 
have, in contemplation of the law, passed out of the breast of the 
judge"); 471 P.2d at 145 ("Judicial errors in judgments are to be 
corrected by appeal"); cf_. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) (trial courts may 
only correct "clerical" errors). Hence, the court's resentencing of 
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Mr. Wright also was an improper and jurisdictionally4 invalid 
attempt to correct its own prior ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Wright respectfully requests this Court to vacate the 
lower court's second sentencing order of August 29, 1994, and to 
reinstate in its place the originally valid July 11, 1994, oral 
sentence. 
SUBMITTED this day of February, 1995. 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
VERNICE AH CHING 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
4. Inherent in the arguments below were those involving 
jurisdiction. See (R 83-84) (counsel informed the court that it 
"cannot change a sentence unless it is an illegally imposed 
sentence"). In any event, "a court's jurisdiction may be challenged 
at any time, even on appeal [.]" State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 
1139 (Utah 1989). 
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ADDENDUM A 
63-63a-L Surcharge — Application and exemptions, 
II) (a) A surcharge shall be paid on all criminal fines, penalties, and forfei-
tures imposed by the courts, 
(b) The surcharge shall be: 
(i) 85% upon conviction of a: 
(A) felony; 
(B) class A misdemeanor, 
(C) violation of Title 41, Chapter 6, Article 5, Driving While 
Intoxicated and Reckless Driving; or 
(D) class B misdemeanor not classified within Title 41, Motor 
Vehicles, including violation of comparable county or municipal 
ordinances; or 
76-3-201 CRIMINAL CODE 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person adjudged guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole, or 
(g) to death. 
76-3-20?) Felony conviction — Indeterminate term of im-
prisonment — Increase of sentence if firearm 
used. 
A person who has been convicted of a felony i i be sentenced to imprison-
ment for an indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term at not less than 
five years, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may 
be for life but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the 
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate 
term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term at not less 
than one year nor more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a 
firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used in the 
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally sen-
tence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and 
not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person 
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run con-
secutively and not concurrently; 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term not to exceed 
five years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the 
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the felony, the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for 
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and 
not concurrently 
76-4-102. Attempt — Classification of offenses. 
Criminal attempt to commit: 
(1) A capital felony is a felony of the first degree; 
(2) A felony of the first degree is a felony of the second degree; except 
that an attempt to commit child kidnaping, or to commit a violation of 
Section 76-5-301.1 or to commit any of those felonies described in Part 4 
of Chapter 5 of this title which are felonies of the first degree, is a felony 
of the first degree; 
(3) A felony of the second degree is a felony of the third degree; 
(4) A felony of the third degree is a class A misdemeanor; 
(5) A class A misdemeanor is a class B misdemeanor; 
(6) A class B misdemeanor is a class C misdemeanor, 
(7) A class C misdemeanor is punishable by a penalty not exceeding 
one half the penalty for a class C misdemeanor. 
76-10-306. Definitions — Persons exempted — Penalties 
for possession, use, or removal of explosives, 
chemical, or incendiary devices and possession 
of components. 
(3) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly possesses or 
controls an explosive, chemical, or incendiary device is guilty of a felony of the 
second degree. 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in 
his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district 
where the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to-bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be 
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail 
and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or 
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a 
husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a 
plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by 
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a 
# f -JLO-jLm uuspciuAuu ui BCUI«IICV — x~ieas neiu in aoeyance 
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence in-
vestigation — Standards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termina-
tion, revocation, modification! or extension —-
Hearings. 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered bjr& defendant in conjunction 
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction 
of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution 
of sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the 
defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Cor-
rections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a 
private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court. 
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the Department of Corrections. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction ot 
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. The court has 
continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of 
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a 
presentence investigation report from the Department of Corrections or 
information from other sources about the defendant. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, 
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed m the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is nendin* 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 30 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in 
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not 
be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to 
present any information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in his absence, he 
may likewise be sentenced in his absence. If a defendant fails to appear for 
sentence, a warrant for his arrest may be issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of his right to appeal and the 
time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make his return on the commitment and file it with the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Amend. V CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
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1 JUNE 2 0 , 1994 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH. 
2 I P R O C E E D I N G S . 
3
 I 
4 I THE COURT: STATE OF UTAH VS. CHARLES 
5 1 DAVID WRIGHT CR 94-519. MR. WRIGHT IS NOW PRESENT. 
6 MR. PARKER HERE FOR THE STATE. MR. MAURO 
7 HERE FOR THE DEFENDANT. 
8 1 MR. MAURO: YOUR HONOR, I GUESS THIS IS A 
9 CASE — FIRST OF ALL, RICH MAURO ON BEHALF OF MR. 
10 WRIGHT. I AM COVERING THIS MATTER FOR VERNIECE 
11 AU CHING. 
12 I TOO HAVE RECEIVED THIS FILE TODAY. AND I 
13 GUESS I'M GOING TO ASSERT THE KAREN STAM RULE AND 
14 SEE IF WE COULD PROCEED TODAY, WITH SOME 
15 RECOMMENDATIONS. 
16 THE COURT: UNLESS IT'S BAD NEWS. 
17 MR. MAURO: THAT WILL — WE WOULD PROPOSE 
18 TO THE COURT — OTHERWISE, WE MAY WANT TO HAVE THE 
19 COURT CONSIDER HAVING MS. AU CHING, WHO KNOWS A 
20 LITTLE MORE ABOUT THINGS AND CAN ADDRESS THE COURT. 
21 THE COURT: I THINK YOU BETTER HAVE 
22 MS. AU CHING COME BACK ON THIS. 
23 MR. MAURO: BECAUSE I TALKED TO MR. WRIGHT 
24 AND INDICATED TO HIM I FELT MORE COMFORTABLE, AT 
25 LEAST IN LIGHT OF MY LOOKING AT THE PRESENTENCE 
b«067 
REPORT, TO HAVE MS. AU CHING ADDRESS COURT. HE 
INDICATED THAT HE WANTEP OVER 
THINK IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT ~ 
THE COURT: THE ONLY PRESENTENCE REPORT, 
1
 THOUGH, :RIMIN* WOULD 
BE BE' ERVED TO WAIT UNTIL MS. AU CHING GETS 
HERE. 
| THE DEFEND» 
THE COURT: BECAUSE SHE KNOWS MORE ABOUT 
10 THE CASE, AND IT WOULD PROBABLY BE 
11 J TODAY IT MAY MTII.I, HI', HAD NKW:; BUT AT LEAST YOU 
12 1 HA BETTER SHOT IF MS. AU CHING WAS HERE AND IS 
13 ABLE TO ADDRESS IT BASED ON THE BACKGROUND. 
14 III I'M', HER: DO WE KNOW WHY THE ONLY THING 
15 WE HAVE IS THAT CRIMINAL HISTORY? 
16 THE COURT: BECAUS uREADY IN 
17 I i 
18j MR. MAURO' NO, HE WAS IN PRISON BEFORE. 
19 I BELIEVE THAT HAS BEEN TERM 
20 I CO-DEFENDANT WAS IN PRISON THINK THE 
21j CO-DEFENDANT WAS ALSO COURT. 
22 THE COURT: ".nnr ™ 
: l\l', II' WK IIAVI', AN •••LP PRESENTENCE REPORT PREPARED IN 
*:« ANOTHER COURT? 
25 1 I MEAN, REASON, WE NEED 
1 MS. AU CHING TO REFRESH OUR RECOLLECTION ON THIS. 
21 MR. PARKER: I ASSUMED THERE WAS A 
3 PRESENTENCE REPORT, BUT I DON'T SEE IT. 
4 MR. MAURO: LET ME TELL YOU WHY THERE IS 
5 NO PRESENTENCE. THERE WAS A OLD — OUT OF THE STATE 
6 OF IOWA — EXTRADITION HOLD. AND PART OF THE PLEA 
7 AGREEMENT IN THIS CASE WAS THAT IF MR. WRIGHT AGREED 
8 TO RETURN TO THE STATE OF IOWA, THAT THE 
9 RECOMMENDATION WOULD BE PROBATION. 
10 WHAT SHE DOES IS CONTACT THE MR. KADELL, 
11 WHO IS THE HEAD OF THE WARRANTS DIVISION AT THE 
12 1 SHERIFFS OFFICE, AND SHE DISCOVERED THAT IOWA 
13 DOESN'T HAVE AN NCIC WARRANT, ONLY A LEGAL WARRANT 
14 IN IOWA. SO THEY ARE NOT GOING TO EXTRADITE HIM. 
15 SO THAT'S WHERE WE ARE AT, I THINK. 
16 THE COURT: I WONDER IF WE OUGHT TO HAVE A 
17 PRESENTENCE REPORT DONE AT THIS TIME, THEN. 
18 MR. MAURO: THAT MAY BE APPROPRIATE. 
19 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WHAT I'M GOING TO 
20 DO IS THIS. I'M GOING TO ORDER A PRESENTENCE 
21 REPORT. I'M GOING TO -- IS MS. AU CHING GOING TO BE 
22 I BACK NEXT WEEK? 
23 MR. MAURO: SHE'S GOING TO BE BACK ON JULY 
24 5TH, IS MY NOTE. SHE'S VISITING SOME FAMILY IN 
25 HAWAII. 
16 
THE COURT: DON'T FOLKS KNOW THAT WHEN 
WHEN WE SET SENTEM" 
TIII'IV ARE GlUNG TO DF" 
MR. MAURO: DON'T THINK — JUDGE 
THINK ""'*"";: SHERE 
THE COURT: RIGHT. WHAT ' „ 
FIRST TIME SHE'S AVAILABLE BE BACK. IN THE 
MEANTIME, ! ALSO GOING ORDER A PRESENTENCE 
OMPLETED 
BEFORE THE 2ND AUGUST. 
IF SHE CAN PERSUADE ME, WE CAN PROCEED ON 
REPORT BEING COMPLETED, THEN I 
THEN WE'LL KEEP THE NEXT DATE 
xhAi - -L ui 
SO ORDER A PRESENTENCE REPORT. I WILL SET 
THIS FOR JULY 11TH AT TWO P. M., AND THEN WE'LL 
1ET ANOTHER DATE, AND ' 
SENTENCING IN THE EVENT THAT WE DO 
."HE PRESENTENCE REPORT. 
22j MR. MAURO: THAN* 
1 , THAT I HAVE. 
24 THE COURT: SO YOU CAN TELL THEM THAT THEY 
